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Runoff and Reality: Externalities,  
Economics, and Traceability Issues in  
Urban Runoff Regulation 
 
Donald J. Kochan* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
If you sneeze, have you polluted?  If you smoke in public, 
have you polluted?  If you wash your car in your driveway, have 
you polluted?  If you fertilize your lawn, have you polluted?  If 
you pull out the chainsaw and take down a tree, have you pol-
luted?  If you run a business that uses chemicals on land-based 
resources, like a coal processing facility, have you polluted?  
What are your legal responsibilities if you take any of these ac-
tions?  Do you know, have you considered it, and do you care?  All 
of the above activities can cause trans-boundary effects—that is, 
effects beyond yourself or beyond your property—and much of the 
harm that these activities can cause is not immediately apparent.  
It is easy to ignore the incidental effects of our actions, yet regu-
lators are increasingly placing a focus on such consequences 
when deciding whether and how to formulate rules for the control 
of pollution. 
The idea of runoff is not intuitive to individuals or busi-
nesses, but knowledge of legal liabilities for actions that create 
externalities through runoff is increasingly important.  As our 
understanding of water quality and sources of pollution becomes 
more sophisticated, cognizance of the implications of the effects of 
that car wash or coal wash becomes far more important for the 
analysis of legal compliance and legal responsibility. 
The answer to all the questions posed above, and similar 
ones, is—“perhaps.”  The conclusion rests on containment of pos-
sible pollutants, internalization of the costs of activities, the 
 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.  J.D. 1998, Cor-
nell Law School; B.A. 1995, Western Michigan University.  Former Visiting Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, George Mason University School of Law, 2002–2003; Olin Research Fellow, 
University of Virginia School of Law, 2003–2004.  I thank my research assistants Amanda 
Collopy and Miles Brandon Fuller for their assistance in preparation for portions of this 
article. 
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harms that actions cause, and the appropriate legal controls and 
remedies if, indeed, those actions harm others.  The other pri-
mary issue is whether, even if harm is caused, whether individu-
als or government can ever figure out the source of the pollution.  
Whether there is or should be legal responsibility for such pollu-
tion lies at the heart of the urban runoff debate.  The possibility 
that personal or business actions will create externalities, includ-
ing eventual runoff that carries “leftovers” into water bodies, is a 
highlight of recent regulatory discussion on pollution control. 
The alley behind my former Washington, D.C. condominium 
had a problem.  Food waste, grease, and undoubtedly contami-
nated water from next door, a small-business restaurant, poured 
down the sloping alley into local sewage drains every night.  The 
restaurant management released this greasy waste with, I sus-
pect, no recognition of the consequences or the potential illegal-
ity.  I often wondered whether these owners knew the legal re-
quirements, whether they had a permit to dump kitchen waste, 
and whether they knew the consequences of this runoff.  I also 
wondered about the pervasiveness of such practices throughout 
similar businesses.  I believe that state and federal regulators 
wonder as well, which explains the increased promulgation of 
regulations and increased monitoring and enforcement of runoff. 
A solution to controlling the imposition of negative external-
ities has long eluded regulators and private enforcers.  My res-
taurant neighbor when I lived in downtown Washington, D.C., 
nightly spewed its garbage into a descending alley—it was runoff 
that ended up in sewers, streets, and sidewalks.  Now this is an 
activity that is replicated—intentionally or unintentionally—
throughout commercial activities.  I highly doubt the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA) ever visited my restaurant 
neighbor.  But the EPA and others are nonetheless concerned.  If 
the restaurant example is not concrete evidence of a problem, 
consider instead the building of a home and the wood chips and 
chemicals seeping into a stream.  Consider the processing of coal 
that may let some waste slide into a lake.  Consider the cutting 
down of trees and whether the wood chips or gasoline that ends 
up in a nearby water body should be considered “pollution.”  This 
paper will examine: (1) whether existing authorities (like the 
Clean Water Act) are capable of providing regulation of urban 
runoff; (2) whether, in light of economic controls, regulating these 
activities is necessary; (3) a summary of recent runoff litigation; 
and (4) what is next, or what should be next.  Although each of 
these questions forms the background inquiry, the primary em-
phasis of this article is on externalities, traceability, collective ac-
tion, and free rider problems that motivate regulation in this 
07) 409-434 KOCHAN (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC 6/30/2006 12:31:26 PM 
2006] Runoff and Reality 411 
area. 
Part I of this article provides a general background of Clean 
Water Act (CWA) regulations and concerns related to runoff.  
Part II discusses the concept of externalities—how runoff allows 
for the imposition of costs on others and leads to a lack of inter-
nalization of costs on the individuals or companies generating the 
original substances that end up causing harm.  Part III discusses 
the regulatory atmosphere as a result of the difficulty of tracing 
the sources of runoff and therefore assigning liability.  Part IV 
explores the necessity of regulation in light of these economic re-
alities, questions whether efficiency demands broad regulation to 
preclude or assess liability for runoff, and assesses whether re-
sponsibility can be efficiently allocated, or whether it is ineffi-
cient to try.  Regulation may be necessary, but economic realities 
must be made part of the analysis in developing such regulation. 
Rather than critique or suggest particular regulatory ap-
proaches, this article remains largely agnostic and focuses on 
discussing the complexities and difficulties that must be taken 
into consideration as regulations develop and are applied in this 
area.  This article attempts to identify the metrics, economics, 
and realities that must underlie runoff regulation.  The ultimate 
conclusion is that economics must be taken into account and 
may, at times, warrant governmental regulation; however, there 
should never be a presumption of government intervention, but, 
instead, an enlightened analysis of economic realities before any 
such regulation is imposed. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
“Environmental protection was not a distinct field of law be-
fore 1970.  Since that time, it has become a growth industry and 
has enjoyed widespread political support . . . .”1  One of the major 
governmental initiatives among 1970s legislation was clean wa-
ter.  Compared to other governmental initiatives, the history of 
clean water legislation may seem short, but the passage and ap-
plication of the CWA has a nearly thirty-five year history with 
ever-evolving focuses of concern.2  Runoff is one of regulators’ 
most recent priorities. 
 
 1 RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 275 (1995). 
 2 For a fairly comprehensive summary of the CWA and its amendments, see Ken-
neth M. Murchison, Learning From More Than Five-and-a-Half Decades of Federal Water 
Pollution Control Legislation:  Twenty Lessons for the Future, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 
527, 528–81 (2005); Shawn J. Johnson, Note, It All Comes Out in the Wash:  Sierra Club v. 
Meiburg:  Nonpoint Source Pollution Continues Unabated as the Eleventh Circuit Refuses 
to Permit Implementation of Total Maximum Daily Loads Through Citizen Suits, 57 ARK. 
L. REV. 349, 359–65 (2004). 
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As Reed Benson notes, “[w]ater pollution has been a major 
environmental issue in the United States for more than three 
decades, and polls indicate that the public remains very con-
cerned about the contamination of America’s rivers, streams, and 
lakes.”3  The concern may be rational or irrational, but it is a pre-
sent concern.4  Thus, the formulation of legal rules regarding wa-
ter pollution—private or public—must receive serious examina-
tion.5 
The issue of runoff extends far beyond restaurant grease 
flushing down a sewer.  Many industries are affected—
development materials, mining waste, agricultural and animal 
byproducts, pesticides, fertilizers, sawdust, oils, household 
chemicals, and many other substances can be washed into water 
streams.6  Once these types of substances are on the ground, rain 
or other means can make them “run off,” which is then released 
into watersheds.  Several sections of the CWA have implications 
for runoff.7 
The CWA was intended “to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”8  At 
the same time, it recognizes that federal standards are not meant 
to overwhelm historically recognized state controls over their 
own waters.9  How states and the federal government create con-
trols, and how they allocate responsibilities, over water quality 
lies at the heart of the debate over the runoff issue.10  After all, 
 
 3 Reed D. Benson, Pollution Without Solution:  Flow Impairment Problems Under 
Clean Water Act Section 303, 24 STAN. ENVTL.  L.J. 199, 200 (2005). 
 4 See EPA, What is Nonpoint Source (NPS) Pollution? Questions and Answers, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/qa.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) [hereinafter EPA, Ques-
tions and Answers]. 
 5 See generally Benson, supra note 3 (scrutinizing the Clean Water Act and discuss-
ing how its proper implementation could better achieve the Act’s stated goals). 
 6 EPA, Questions and Answers, supra note 4. 
 7 See Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1125–29 (9th Cir. 2002) (providing a brief 
summary of the relevant provisions of the CWA).  Other recent symposia have also ad-
dressed some of these issues.  See Symposium, The Clean Water Act at Thirty: Progress, 
Problems, Potential, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537 (2004); Symposium, The Clean Water Act Turns 
30: Celebrating Its Past, Predicting Its Future, 33 ENVTL. L. 27 (2003). 
 8 Clean Water Act § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 9 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 101(b); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000) (acknowledging “the 
primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution”).  
For a discussion of the general economics of federalism concerns, see RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 695–96 (5th ed. 1998). 
 10 Consider, for example, these comments from Murchison, describing federal versus 
state land use controls: 
  In the United States, pollution from nonpoint sources presents the most 
obvious example of this resistance to effective water pollution control. In part, 
the exclusion of nonpoint sources arises from the difficulty of controlling pollu-
tion that enters water bodies from diffuse rather than discrete sources, but the 
philosophical basis runs much deeper. United States environmental law has 
always backed away from direct federal control of land use, and land use con-
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when we are dealing with water, a transient, moving, and often 
uncontained resource, boundaries are difficult to define.11 
The CWA has been fairly successful in its initial focus on 
controlling direct dumping of pollutants into waterways.  How-
ever, as the nation moves forward, attention has increasingly 
turned to focus on the effects of runoff on overall water quality.12  
We are beyond the formative years of water quality regulation, 
but perhaps not in relation to runoff.13  In recent years, much 
more focus has been placed on the regulatory control of runoff.  It 
is, in part, a regulatory success that the prioritization of govern-
mental efforts can now explore less direct contributions to poor 
water quality, like runoff.14  As a result of this prioritization, the 
major issues are now: the whether, the how, the means, and the 
necessity of regulation.  This article argues that each of these is-
sues should be decided after considering an analysis of economic 
 
trols are the basis for effective control of water pollution from nonpoint sources. 
Nowhere is this aversion to federal land use regulation more ingrained than 
with respect to agricultural pollution. 
Murchison, supra note 2, at 581. 
 11 See Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201, 
206–07 (2004).  As Lazarus explains: 
  Activities in one part of the country can affect environmental quality in lo-
cations tens, if not hundreds or thousands, of miles away. In the natural envi-
ronment, cause and effect are also spread out over long periods of time. Actions 
taken today can have environmental impacts that last for centuries and, in 
some instances, do not even have any perceptible impact for decades. The up-
shot is both tremendous scientific uncertainty in cause and effect and an in-
herent lack of equivalency between who pays the costs of environmental pro-
tection and who enjoys the benefits of that protection. Environmental legal 
rules invariably regulate activities at one location and/or at one time in order 
to avoid harms or confer benefits on persons or environmental amenities at an-
other place or time. 
Id. (footnote omitted).  See also id. at 207 (describing the “tension with the physical na-
ture of the problem, which does not so neatly follow state borders and which naturally 
pits downstream and downwind states and localities against upstream and upwind states 
and localities”). 
 12 Sonya Dewan, Note, Emissions Trading:  A Cost-Effective Approach to Reducing 
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL.  L. REV. 233, 237 (2004) (“The desire to 
regulate nonpoint source pollution is relatively new . . . .”); see also Murchison, supra note 
2, at 527 (“In the United States, federal water pollution control legislation has evolved 
significantly over the last five-and-a-half decades. Since 1948, the federal government has 
assumed an increasingly dominant role in efforts to control the pollution of surface wa-
ters.”). 
 13 See Lazarus, supra note 11 at 212 (“We have largely failed to impose effective con-
trols on nonpoint sources of pollution, especially of water pollution, which threaten to 
overwhelm the environmental progress achieved by controls imposed on point source in-
dustrial dischargers of pollution into the nation’s waters.”); see also Oliver A. Houck, 
TMDLs: The Resurrection of Water Quality Standards-Based Regulation Under the Clean 
Water Act, 27 ENVTL. L. REP. 10329 (1997); Oliver A. Houck, The Clean Water Act TMDL 
Program V: Aftershock and Prelude, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10385 (2002); Murchison, supra 
note 2, at 587 (“[P]ollution from nonpoint sources constitutes an ever greater portion of 
the remaining pollution . . . .”). 
 14 See Murchison, supra note 2, at 527. 
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realities.15 
Enacted in 1972, the CWA functions primarily by prohibiting 
any “discharge” of pollutants to waters of the United States from 
a “point source” without a permit.16  A “point source” is “any dis-
cernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not lim-
ited to any pipe, ditch, channel . . . from which pollutants are or 
may be discharged.”17    The National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES), established in CWA section 402, pro-
vides a system for the permitting of any discharge of pollutants 
from a point source.18  The NPDES is a federal program, but it 
may be, and most often is, administered by States that have en-
acted laws deemed equivalent to those existing in the federal sys-
tem.19  Diffuse runoff, such as rain water that is not channeled 
through a “point source,” is considered nonpoint source pollution 
and is generally not subject to federal regulation.20 
Where storm water is channeled, such as by municipal storm 
water drains, the resulting point source discharge is subject to 
CWA regulation.  One very common type of storm water dis-
charge is from municipal storm sewer systems, which collect run-
off from wide areas, channel it, and ultimately discharge it to a 
waterbody through a “point source.”  Virtually any other type of 
land use activity can also be a source of storm water discharge, if 
runoff from the area becomes channelized or otherwise dis-
charged through a point source to waters of the United States.21 
During the 1970s and 1980s, it became apparent that the 
sheer diversity and number of “storm water discharges” made 
them ill-suited for regulation under the original NPDES sys-
tem.22  Thus, in the Water Quality Act of 1987, Congress 
amended the CWA in part to establish a new scheme to regulate 
storm water discharges under CWA section 402(p).23  The storm 
 
 15 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 3–4 (“[E]conomics is the science of rational choice a 
world—our world—in which resources are limited in relation to human wants.”). 
 16 Clean Water Act §§ 301, 402(a); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342(a) (2000). 
 17 Clean Water Act § 502(14); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
 18 Clean Water Act § 402; 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 19 Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000); see also EPA, National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES): State Program Status, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (listing status of NPDES programs by state) 
(last visited May 15, 2006). 
 20 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1093–95 (9th Cir. 
1998). 
 21 See, e.g., American Mining Congress v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 965 F.2d 759, 762 
(9th Cir. 1992) (upholding EPA regulation of storm water discharges from abandoned 
mines). 
 22 See 133 CONG. REC. 1,264 (1987). 
 23 Clean Water Act §402(p); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000); see also EPA, National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for Storm Water Dis-
charges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990 (Nov. 16, 1990). 
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water program is the one of greatest significance for “runoff” is-
sues, although other parts of the CWA admittedly play a role.  
There is a debate dealing with the identification of runoff that is 
“channeled” through a “point” like a sewage system and runoff 
that simply contributes pollution to a water body—and how to 
regulate each given available statutory authority.24  The EPA has 
adopted various techniques to deal with regulating both. 
Therefore, the subject of this journal issue and its related 
symposium—runoff—is often described as “non-point source” pol-
lution and regulated generally under the auspices thereof.25  
There is a need to determine how water bodies can be protected 
from trans-boundary pollution from non-discrete sources.26  The 
purpose of this article is to stress that none of the available regu-
latory options can be accomplished or analyzed efficiently with-
out a basic recognition of the economic realities involved. 
According to the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency, “[s]tates report that nonpoint source pollution is the 
leading remaining cause of water quality problems.”27  Nonpoint 
source pollution involves substances that end up in the water 
stream, but not as a result of straight out-of-the-pipe dumping 
known as “point source” pollution.28  Although debatable, some 
 
 24 For a judicial analysis of competing arguments, see Pronsolino v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 
1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 25 “Nonpoint sources of pollution are non-discrete sources; sediment run-off from 
timber harvesting, for example . . . .”  Id.; see also Thomas K. Ruppert, Water Quality 
Trading and Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution:  An Analysis of the Effectiveness and 
Fairness of EPA’s Policy on Water Quality Trading, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 33 (2004) 
(“Runoff from agriculture now constitutes one of our most serious water quality prob-
lems.”). 
 26 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 11, at 212. 
 27 EPA, Questions and Answers, supra note 4; see also Erin Tobin, Pronsolino v. 
Nastri: Are TMDLS for Nonpoint Sources the Key to Controlling the “Unregulated” Half of 
Water Pollution?, 33 ENVTL.  L. 807 (2003): 
  Without dispute, nonpoint source pollution is the nation’s leading water 
quality problem, contributing to nearly half of the water quality impairment 
nationwide.  Nonpoint source pollution commonly refers to polluted runoff from 
diffuse sources such as agricultural activities, timber harvest, urban develop-
ment, and grazing. 
Id. at 808 (footnote omitted).  See also Dewan, supra note 12, at 233 (“A significant 
amount of U.S. water pollution originates from nonpoint sources . . . .”); Benson, supra 
note 3, at 225 (“[A]gricultural runoff constitutes the biggest remaining source of water 
pollution problems in the nation. . . . [H]uman-caused flow alterations represent a signifi-
cant and commonly overlooked form of nonpoint source pollution under the CWA.”); See 
also generally Drew L. Kershen, Agricultural Water Pollution: From Point to Nonpoint 
and Beyond, 9 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 3, 3–5 (1995). 
28 A point source is “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance” having a 
particular “point” at which pollutant levels can be measured.  Clean Water Act § 502(14); 
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000).  See also Sierra Club v. Meiburg, 296 F.3d 1021, 1024–25 
(11th Cir. 2002); Ruppert, supra note 24, at 26 (footnotes omitted) (“After initial passage 
of the CWA in 1972, attention was focused on point sources of pollution.  Point sources 
(PSs) are usually associated with a pipe that discharges wastewater into streams, lakes, 
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think that nonpoint source pollution is the critical issue for water 
quality today.  For example, Robert Adler argues: 
By now, it is beyond dispute that polluted runoff and erosion from 
farms, grazing lands, logging, mining, and other intensive land uses 
(so-called nonpoint source pollution) is the most significant remaining 
source of pollution in rural waters, and that contaminated urban 
(stormwater) runoff is similarly responsible for a significant percent-
age of ongoing urban and suburban water pollution. It is equally clear 
that those sources of pollution have escaped the type of more rigorous 
controls to which point sources are subjected, and that existing “solu-
tions” to the problem are not working.29 
 
or rivers.  The National Pollutant Elimination Discharge System (NPDES), which regu-
lates the granting of permits under the CWA, represents this focus on PSs.”).  For a dis-
cussion of the distinction between point and nonpoint sources, see Carol M. Rose, Envi-
ronmental Law Grows Up (More or Less), and What Science Can Do to Help, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 273, 279 (2005).  Rose explains that the first wave of water quality control 
focused on point source pollution and a new wave relates to nonpoint sources: 
  The First Wave approaches to environmental law clearly had some suc-
cess, adding needed muscle to the exercise of setting quality-based goals. With-
out that muscle, little would have happened for the usual tragedy-of-the-
commons reasons: even industries that wished to take environmentally 
friendly measures might not have done so, fearing that competitors would take 
the cheaper route of doing nothing, evading discovery, and ultimately gaining a 
competitive advantage. . . . [T]here was a certain logic to another aspect of the 
First Wave’s controls, that is, concentrating controls at the end of the pipe. The 
end of the pipe, or “point source” as it was called, was the place where pollution 
control performance could be measured easily. 
Id.  Rose continues to describe the facts that point sources were a natural starting point 
for water quality control, but claims that nonpoint sources may be a major culprit that 
deserves attention: 
  Another “flexibility” complaint focused on the end-of-the-pipe methodology 
of early [“behavior based” or] BB regulation. . . . The trouble was that pollution 
from the point sources was easier to measure and hence to regulate, but in fact 
the less tractable nonpoint sources might be a bigger source of troubles. This 
issue has been especially noticeable in water pollution, where controls on point 
sources left more or less untouched the serious pollution from construction, ag-
riculture, and city streets’ runoff—all “nonpoint” sources that are hard to 
measure and monitor. Nonpoint sources are small and inconvenient to regu-
late, but they not only add up, they can also interact in various deadly forms. 
Id. at 280. 
 29 Robert W. Adler, Fresh Water—Toward a Sustainable Future, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10167, 10184 (2002). See also Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs, Are We There Yet?: The Long 
Road Toward Water Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 ENTVL. L. 
REP. 10391, 10399 (1997) (footnote omitted) (“It is no secret to any observer of the Clean 
Water Act that the primary reason for this mushrooming [nonpoint source pollution] prob-
lem is the fact that while other sources have been abated through required controls and 
their enforcement, no comparable controls or enforcement have been applied to agricul-
ture, silviculture, and the rest of the nonpoint world.”); Victor B. Flatt, Spare the Rod and 
Spoil the Law: Why the Clean Water Act Has Never Grown Up, 55 ALA. L. REV. 595, 597–
99 (2004) (blaming nonpoint sources for continuing pollution problems); Ruppert, supra 
note 25, at 3 (“As significant water quality improvements resulted from the NPDES pro-
gram and PS pollution reductions, it became clear that non-point source (NPS) pollution 
contributes greatly to remaining water quality problems.  It eventually became evident 
that PS reductions alone would not suffice to clean up waterways and that the challenges 
presented by NPSs needed to be addressed.”). 
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Adler identifies the sensitivities regarding runoff that have been 
used to justify recent regulatory efforts. 
There is certainly a heightened sensitivity among regulators 
and environmental interest groups over the potential impact of 
nonpoint source pollution.30  Although it is difficult to fully dis-
cern what is “pollution” in nonpoint source pollution, the EPA de-
fines it as the following: 
Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and 
sewage treatment plants, comes from many diffuse sources. NPS pol-
lution is caused by rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the 
ground. As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural and 
human-made pollutants, finally depositing them into lakes, rivers, 
wetlands, coastal waters, and even our underground sources of drink-
ing water. These pollutants include: 
• Excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricul-
tural lands and residential areas; 
• Oil, grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy 
production; 
• Sediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop 
and forest lands, and eroding streambanks; 
• Salt from irrigation practices and acid drainage from aban-
doned mines; 
• Bacteria and nutrients from livestock, pet wastes, and faulty 
septicsystems; 
Atmospheric deposition and hydromodification are also sources of 
nonpoint source pollution.31 
As a result, determining the origin of certain pollutants be-
comes very difficult—if they cannot be traced to a certain dump-
ing pipe because the substances simply runoff from a nonpoint 
source, it becomes far more difficult to identify the origin of con-
taminants.32  This article explores these difficulties. 
The EPA has explained the importance, significance, and is-
sue of urban runoff as follows: 
  The National Water Quality Inventory: 2000 Report to Congress 
identified urban runoff as one of the leading sources of water quality 
impairment in surface waters. Urban sources can also contaminate 
ground water. . . . 
 
 30 EPA, Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for States and Territories, 
68 Fed. Reg. 60,653 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
 31 EPA, Questions and Answers, supra note 4. 
 32 “Nonpoint source pollution, including the potential for groundwater contamina-
tion, is not easily addressed by the means which are employed for controlling pollutants 
from point sources.” Martha L. Noble & J.W. Looney, The Emerging Legal Framework for 
Animal Agricultural Waste Management in Arkansas, 47 ARK L. REV. 159, 177–78 (1994). 
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  People and their actions are the most significant sources and 
causes of urban runoff and pollution. 33 
The EPA continues to define the most substantial areas of urban 
runoff concern: 
  Uncontrolled or treated runoff from the urban environment and 
from construction activities can run off the landscape into surface wa-
ters. This runoff can include such pollutants as sediments, pathogens, 
fertilizers/nutrients, hydrocarbons, and metals. Pavement and com-
pacted areas, roofs, and reduced tree canopy and open space increase 
runoff volumes that rapidly flow into our waters. This increase in vol-
ume and velocity of runoff often causes stream bank erosion, channel 
incision and sediment deposition in stream channels. In addition, run-
off from these developed areas can increase stream temperatures that 
along with the increase in flow rate and pollutant loads negatively af-
fect water quality and aquatic life. 
  Other common sources of urban pollution include improperly 
sited, designed and maintained onsite wastewater treatment (septic) 
systems, pet wastes, lawn and garden fertilizers and pesticides, 
household chemicals that are improperly disposed of, automobile flu-
ids, road deicing/anti-icing chemicals, and vehicle emissions.34 
In addition to and in conjunction with federal regulation, 
most states have implemented plans to control for the contribu-
tion of runoff and non-point source pollution to water quality, but 
it is a still developing area of environmental law.35  The complex-
 
 33 EPA, National Management Measures to Control Nonpoint Source Pollution from 
Urban Areas, http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/urbanmm/#01 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) 
[hereinafter EPA, National Management Measures], EPA-841-B-05-004, NATIONAL 
MANAGEMENT MEASURES TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION FROM URBAN AREAS 
(2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/urbanmm/pdf/urban_guidance.pdf.  For 
a discussion of  regulatory guidance on best management practices (BMPs) to control and 
prevent urban runoff, see EPA, OFFICE OF WATER, EPA-841-B-00-007, TECHNIQUES FOR 
TRACKING, EVALUATING, AND REPORTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NONPOINT SOURCE 
CONTROL MEASURES: III URBAN (2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/ 
urban.pdf.  Other informative materials on EPA’s response to nonpoint source issues in-
clude: Envtl. Def. Ctr., v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 319 F.3d 398 (9th Cir. 2003); City of 
Abilene v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 325 F.3d 657, 664 (5th Cir. 2003); OLIVER A. HOUCK, 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND IMPLEMENTATION 50–51 (2d 
ed. 2002); Linda A. Malone, The Myths and Truths That Ended the 2000 TMDL Program, 
20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 63, 63–64 (2002); James R. May, The Rise and Repose of Assimi-
lation-Based Water Quality, Part I: TMDL Litigation, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10247 (2004); 
Thomas G. Echikson & Gregory P. Lauro, When It Rains It Pours: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture Regulation of Wet Weather Discharges, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10150 (2004); Edwin A. 
Skoch, II, Regulation of Storm Water Discharges Under the Clean Water Act, 23 ENVTL. L. 
1087, 1087–94 (1993); David Strifling, Sanitary Sewer Overflows: Past, Present, and Fu-
ture Regulation, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 225, 230–32 (2003); Laurel A. David, The EPA’s Com-
bined Sewer Overflow Abatement Methods: Do They Comply with the Clean Water Act, 35 
URB. LAW. 533, 541–44 (2003); Douglas R. Williams, When Voluntary, Incentive-Based 
Controls Fail: Structuring a Regulatory Response to Agricultural Nonpoint Source Water 
Pollution, 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 21 (2002). 
 34 EPA, National Management Measures, supra note 33. 
 35 See generally ENVTL. LAW INST., ALMANAC OF ENFORCEABLE STATE LAWS TO 
CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION (1998). 
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ity of this process of regulation, however, is high.36  Although 
there is a perceived need to add further regulatory controls, the 
EPA has recognized that “the nation is experiencing increasingly 
positive results in terms of both on-the-ground action and actual 
water quality improvements.”37  The overall issue of regulation of 
runoff and nonpoint sources requires continuing analysis and 
must take into account both positive and negative environmental 
and economic consequences of regulation.38 
III.  RUNOFF AND CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES 
Effective control of externalities is a fundamental basis of 
property law.39  Pollution control necessarily involves issues of 
property law.40  Property law continuously struggles to find an 
efficient allocation of liabilities for the harms one owner’s actions 
may impose on others.41 
Harold Demsetz describes this concept well when he explains 
that “[a] primary function of property rights is that of guiding in-
centives to achieve a greater internalization of externalities.”42  
When property rights and boundaries are ill-defined, it becomes 
difficult to control depletion of resources and to control pollu-
tion.43  As a result, there are always tensions between pri-
 
 36 See generally Robert W. Adler, Controlling Nonpoint Source Water Pollution: Is 
Help on the Way (From the Courts or EPA)?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10270 (2001). 
 37 EPA, Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for States and Territories, 
68 Fed. Reg. 60,653, 60,654 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
 38 For an economic justification for regulation in this area, see EPA, OFFICE OF 
WETLANDS, OCEANS AND WATERSHEDS, EPA-841-S-95-002, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF 
RUNOFF CONTROLS (1995), available at http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/runoff.html. 
 39 Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348 
(1967); see also Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for De-
lineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S486 (2002) (“A number of patterns in 
property rights can be explained as variation along the methods of delineation, reflecting 
their respective costs and benefits.”); JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 48 
(5th ed. 2002) (“‘Externality,’ Demsetz says, ‘is an ambiguous concept.’ It is also an impor-
tant one that you will be confronting more than occasionally [in the study of property 
law].”). 
 40 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 39, at 55 (“Pollution and other environmental 
problems have important relationships to property . . . .”).  For a valuable discussion of 
property law, including its interaction with governmental regulation, see generally Her-
bert Hovenkamp & Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Property: An Introductory Survey (5th 
ed. 2001). 
 41 See POSNER, supra note 9, at 36 (discussing the impacts of externalities and noting 
that “legal protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources effi-
ciently.”). 
 42 Demsetz, supra note 39, at 348.  See also generally Fred S. McChesney, What’d I 
Say?: Coase, Demsetz and the Unending Externality Debate (Northwestern University 
School of Law, Law & Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 04-01),  
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=491182. 
 43 See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968); 
James M. Buchanan & Young J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticom-
mons, 43 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2000); Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scat-
tering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131 (2000); HENRY N. BUTLER & 
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vate/market-based land use controls and public land use controls 
to solve such externality issues, depending on economic values 
and the appropriate role for government.44  “The practical prob-
lem is one of extension and elaboration of the private rights of ac-
tion into the public sphere.”45  Judicial land use controls like 
trespass and nuisance were the starting point,46 but increasingly 
governmental regulation has been viewed as necessary for effec-
tively controlling externalities based on the theory that individu-
als subject themselves to the government’s jurisdiction and the 
government has a responsibility to control against the imposition 
of harms.47 
Externalities are the imposition of costs or benefits on an-
other as a result of one’s use of his property.48  As the Council on 
Environmental Quality explained, part of environmental 
1regulation is based on controlling such external costs when they 
cannot be controlled by the market: 
Our price system fails to take into account the environmental damage 
that the polluter inflicts on others.  Economists call these damages . . . 
 
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS 21–24 (2d ed. 2006). 
 44 See Demsetz, supra note 39, at 350 (“Some communities will have less well-
developed private ownership systems and more highly developed state ownership sys-
tems.” see also Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, The Property Right Paradigm, 33 J. 
ECON. HIST. 16, 22 (1973) (“The social consequences of the identity of right owners also 
can have allocative effects.  At the more obvious level, government and private owners, 
respectively, will respond in greater degree to political and market incentives, and this 
can be expected to yield differing resource uses.”); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social 
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 9 (1960) (“[T]here is no reason why, on occasion, such governmen-
tal administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in economic efficiency.  
This would seem particularly likely when, as is normally the case with the smoke nui-
sance, a large number of people are involved and in which therefore the costs of handling 
the problem through the market or the firm may be high.”); see generally Fred McChes-
ney, Government as Definer of Property Rights, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, 
CONFLICT, AND LAW 227 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds. 2003). 
 45 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 280. 
 46 For an analysis of the historical developments in trespass and nuisance, see H. 
Marlow Green, Note, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A Comparative 
Analysis of Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model for the 
Future, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 541, 544–45 (1997).  On the possible limitations of tort law 
to control externalities, see BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 122. 
 47 “‘[I]t would be a direct contradiction for any one to enter into society with others 
for the securing and regulating of property, and yet to suppose his land . . . should be ex-
empt from the jurisdiction of that government to which he himself, and the property of 
the land, is a subject.’”  John A. Humbach, Evolving Thresholds of Nuisance and the Tak-
ings Clause, 18 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 6 n.25 (1993) (quoting 2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO 
TREATISES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT ch. 3, 178 (Everyman’s Library 1991) (1690)). 
 48 As Demsetz explains: 
  It is important to note that property rights convey the right to benefit or 
harm oneself or others. . . . [P]roperty rights specify how persons may be bene-
fited or harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the actions 
taken by persons.  The recognition of this leads easily to the close relationship 
between property rights and externalities. 
Demsetz, supra note 39, at 347. 
07) 409-434 KOCHAN (PAGENUM, HYPH, EN&EM).DOC 6/30/2006 12:31:26 PM 
2006] Runoff and Reality 421 
“external social costs.”  They reflect the ability of one entity, e.g., a 
company, to use water or air as a free resource for waste disposal, 
while others pay the cost in contaminated air or water.  If there were 
a way to make the price structure shoulder these external costs—
taxing the firm for the amount of discharge, for instance—then the 
price for the goods and services produced would reflect those costs.  
Failing this, goods whose production spawns pollution are greatly un-
derpriced because the purchaser does not pay for pollution abatement 
that would prevent environmental damage.  Not only does this failure 
encourage pollution but it warps the price structure.49 
Thus, external costs are a possible justification for governmental 
control of pollution, including runoff—bypassing or rejecting a 
market approach.50 
There are both negative and positive externalities associated 
with individual actions that play into the framework and forma-
tion of legal rules and priorities.51  When costs are imposed on 
another, there are negative externalities.52  Runoff is generally 
placed in this category.  With negative externalities, one uses his 
property and internalizes the benefits or profit of the use, but 
does not internalize all negative consequences of that use.53  
When benefits are captured by another, there are positive exter-
nalities.54  One uses his property and internalizes most benefits, 
but the use actually brings profits to another outside the system 
of exchange.  Given these realities, the externality issue involves 
the analysis of property uses and whether both costs and benefits 
are internalized and how doctrines or regulations should develop 
as a result.55 
Robert Cutting and Lawrence Cahoon describe pollution as 
 
 49 THE FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, at 12 
(1970). 
 50 “Most pollution policy . . . is not approached from a property rights perspective, 
where compensation and liability provide incentives for control; rather, public policy ac-
cepts pollution as a public bad that is the government’s responsibility.”  TERRY L. 
ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM 136 (1991). 
 51 BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 176–86. 
 52 Id. at 175 (“Pollution and similar problems occur when people do not bear all of 
the costs of their actions.”).  See also id. at 20, 121–22, 175–218, 336–40. 
 53 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 39, at 348 (“‘Internalizing’ such effects refers to a 
process, usually a change in property rights, that enables these effects to bear (in greater 
degree) on all interacting persons.”). 
 54 See BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 184–86. 
 55 As Dukeminier and Krier explain: 
  Externalities exist whenever some person, say X, makes a decision about 
how to use resources without taking full account of the effects of the decision.  
X ignores some of the effects—some of the costs or benefits that would result 
from a certain activity, for example—because they fall on others.  They are “ex-
ternal” to X, hence the label externalities.  As a consequence of externalities, 
resources tend to be misused or “misallocated,” which is to say used in one way 
when another would make society as a whole better off. 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 39, at 48.  See also id. at 55, 745, 859, 951. 
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involving generators and receptors—persons who generate pol-
lutants and persons who receive negative externalities from such 
generation.56  They explain this issue of controlling trans-
boundary effects: 
  The political institutions and the Property Rights Movement since 
the Industrial Revolution have honed in on the rights within private 
property boundaries (the “generators”), to the exclusion of the rights of 
those outside those boundaries (the “receptors”).  This has created a 
classic, “can’t see the forest for the trees” scenario, and we suggest 
that the field of vision ought to be broadened to include: 1) the rights 
of all receptors (landowners and lawful occupiers, public or private) to 
be free of the effects of pollution (“externalities”), and 2) the responsi-
bility of all generators of environmental alteration to safeguard those 
rights.  To paraphrase George Carlin: “You should keep your stuff in 
your space.”  Any alteration of nature must (in addition to any other 
onsite regulations) be contained within the three-dimensional con-
struct of the property boundaries.  This methodology directly internal-
izes all potential off-site effects of any action.  The burden should be 
on the generator to identify, and to contain or mitigate, all trans-
boundary effects.57 
The question becomes whether the generators have respon-
sibilities to the unwilling receptors (individuals or society as a 
whole) for any harms imposed.58  It is a question of preserving ef-
ficiency by identifying the types of legal controls that can lead to 
the internalization of harms from one’s use of property.59  The 
cynical view is that, absent legal controls, property owners will 
impose costs on other owners and society.  As Carol Rose claims, 
“[l]andowners become accustomed to regarding their land as 
their property, but they simultaneously regard the adjacent air, 
water, and wildlife as goods that are free for the taking . . . .”60  
James Huffman describes this concept of internalization as fol-
lows: 
The efficiency theory assumes that market participants bear the full 
costs of their activities.  When those costs are “externalized” to third 
parties, there is a market failure in the sense that one of the assumed 
conditions of an efficient market is missing.  In such cases, regulations 
may be designed to internalize the full costs to the decision maker.61 
 
 56 Robert H. Cutting & Lawrence B. Cahoon, Thinking Outside the Box: Property 
Rights as a Key to Environmental Protection, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 55, 58–59 (2005). 
 57 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 58 Id. 
 59 For classic instructive cases on externality controls, public and private, see: Prah 
v. Maretti, 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 
(N.Y. 1970); Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972). 
 60 Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 137 (1998). 
 61 James L. Huffman, The Public Interest in Private Property Rights, 50 OKLA. L. 
REV. 377, 380 n.11 (1997).  See also William Simmons & Robert H. Cutting, Jr., A Many 
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Because runoff has the capability of causing pollutants on 
one’s land to become transient, internalization of costs or con-
tainment become important issues in the formulation of legal 
rules, responsibilities, and liabilities. 
The problems associated with runoff largely involve the im-
position of negative externalities—one uses his property and re-
sources in a manner that spills costs onto other discrete property 
owners or society as a whole in their interest of clean waters.62  
Just like stray soot, stray smells, stray animals, or other things 
that cross and transcend boundaries, runoff creates risks that 
negative effects will be imposed on another.63  One could even 
think about it like second-hand smoke,64 or the steam or sparks 
from a passing train.65 
Demsetz offers the following example to generally explain 
this externality problem: 
The short-hand description for [the externality issue] is that private 
costs (or benefits), which do influence a resource owner, are not 
equivalent to the total of social costs (or benefits) associated with the 
 
Layered Wonder: Nonvehicular Air Pollution Control Law in California, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 
109, 113 (1974); J.H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY & PRICES 7–8 (1968); Erik T. Verhoef,  
Externalities, in HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMICS 197–214  
(Jeroen C.J.M. van den Bergh ed., 1999). 
 62 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 39, at 348 (“Some costs and benefits are not taken 
into account by users of resources whenever externalities exist, but allowing transactions 
increases the degree to which internalization takes place.”). 
 63 Consider, for example, Coase’s discussion of the “straying cattle which destroy 
crops growing on neighboring land.”  Coase, supra note 44, at 2. 
 64 Margaret M. Blair, The Economics of Post September-11 Financial Aid to Airlines, 
36 IND. L. REV. 367, 371 (2003). 
 65 Consider Halsbury’s description of the “spark” externality from trains and the as-
sociated risk as analgous to the movement of materials by water runoff: 
  If railway undertakers use steam engines on their railway without express 
statutory authority to do so they are absolutely liable for fires caused by sparks 
from engines. However, railway undertakers generally have statutory powers 
to use steam engines and therefore, if an engine incorporates up-to-date pre-
cautions against the escape of sparks and is used without negligence, they will 
not be liable at common law for damage resulting from that escape. 
  The fact that sparks from an engine caused a fire appears to raise a pre-
sumption that the undertakers were negligent, but it is always a question of 
fact whether, on the evidence, they were guilty of negligence in the construc-
tion or the use of the engine or in some other way in relation to the fire.  In the 
design and construction of a steam engine, the undertakers are bound to use 
all the available devices (for instance spark arresters) to avoid doing harm hav-
ing regard to the likelihood of the danger and the cost and convenience of the 
remedy, but there is no negligence if the undertakers refuse to use an appara-
tus the efficiency of which is open to doubt. 
  Although there may be negligence in the design, construction or working of 
the engine, an undertaker may be liable for damage done by fire caused by 
sparks if, by leaving inflammable material close to the line, its negligence 
caused the damage. 
39(1) HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 18–19 (4th ed. 1998) (under the heading “Sparks 
from engines”). 
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way an owner uses his resources.  An example . . . concerns the use of 
soft coal by a steelmaker.  The soft coal produces soot.  The soot de-
scends on a neighboring laundry, making it more difficult for the 
laundry to clean its customers’ clothes, but this cost is not faced by the 
owner of the steel mill when he decides to use soft coal to fuel the 
steelmaking process.66 
Just as soot, in this example, can fly through the air and affect 
another business or the general quality of the air consumed by 
the public, pollutants can be washed away by water into particu-
lar or publicly shared water resources. 
In property law, furthermore, the concept of sic utere tuo ut 
alienum non laedas dominates, where individuals may use their 
property as they wish so long as they internalize the costs of 
their actions, and respect their neighbors by not imposing nega-
tive externalities.67  Runoff involves the imposition of foreign 
costs upon others.  Thus, the extraterritorial and trans-boundary 
nature of runoff has been used, on this basic principle, to justify 
private and public land use controls and judicial remedies for the 
imposition of such harms from such runoff—i.e., the party is re-
sponsible if their pollutants end up somewhere else.  One reason 
for legal intervention is that this party, whether by his own ac-
tions or the forces of nature, has imposed a cost on another.68  
Secondly, private and public regulation assume that the owner at 
the point of origin is the least cost avoider of the harms that may 
result from runoff and, therefore, should have liability if things 
stray and should also have responsibility to contain pollutants.69 
 
 66 Harold Demsetz, Ownership and the Externality Problem, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 282, 283 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney 
eds. 2003).  See also Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Compe-
tition Between Private and Collective Ownership, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S653, S665 (2002) 
(“Externality-type problems remain an important consideration . . . .”). 
 67 See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 145 (1876) (“The doctrine that each one 
must so use his own as not to injure his neighbor—sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas—is 
the rule by which every member of society must possess and enjoy his property . . . .”). 
 68 As Butler and Drahozal describe: 
  Externalities exist when the actions of one party affect the utility or pro-
duction possibilities of another party outside the exchange relationship.  Ex-
ternalities can prevent a free market from being efficient.  If a firm emits pol-
lution into the air, it can adversely affect the welfare of the firm’s surrounding 
neighbors.  If the firm does not bear these costs, it is likely to select an ineffi-
cient level of pollution (that is, to overpollute).  In choosing how much to invest 
in pollution control equipment, the firm will consider only its private costs and 
benefits.  A socially-efficient investment would also consider the costs and 
benefits imposed on the neighbors. 
BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 25–26. 
 69 Ruppert explains: 
  Externalization of agriculture’s pollution costs leads not only to distribu-
tional concerns, but also to efficiency concerns.  Conventional economic analy-
sis makes farming practices that externalize costs to the environment look 
more efficient than those practices that reduce impacts on the environment.  
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Basically, runoff involves the migration of pollutants—and 
the imposition of costs on others when one’s actions do not fully 
internalize the costs of pollutants carried by stormwater from one 
property to another.  “Pollution is the most obvious example of an 
externality.”70  The challenge is to determine: (1) what consti-
tutes a “pollutant”; (2) what culpability we should place on indi-
viduals for natural migration of such “pollutants”; (3) what re-
sponsibilities should we place on individuals for preventing such 
migration, or liability once it occurs; and (4) what method of con-
trol is appropriate, primarily whether private or public regula-
tory controls are optimal and appropriate.  Thus, a fundamental 
economic consideration is this allocation of controls and liabilities 
in light of these four issues.  Speaking in relation to private 
remedies, Ronald Coase aptly describes this formational legal is-
sue, equally applicable to private or public, judicial or legislative, 
controls: 
What has to be decided is whether the gain from preventing the harm 
is greater than the loss which would be suffered elsewhere as a result 
of stopping the action which produces the harm.  In a world in which 
there are costs of rearranging the rights established by the legal sys-
tem, the courts, in cases relating to nuisance, are, in effect, making a 
decision on the economic problem and determining how resources are 
to be employed.71 
Discussing the relative benefits of private versus governmental 
controls, Coase continues: “[C]orrective government action . . . is 
not necessarily unwise.  But there is a real danger that extensive 
government intervention in the economic system may lead to the 
protection of those responsible for harmful effects being carried 
too far.”72 
It is argued that “corrective” governmental regulation exists 
to address market failures73—when people cannot negotiate to 
 
Accounting for externalized costs and inputting them into the analysis allows 
conservation-type farming methods to compete economically. . . . While the effi-
ciency of cost internalization dictates that agriculture should shoulder its costs 
to abate its pollution as we have required of other industries and activities, pol-
icy regarding agriculture and the environment should, at a minimum, not be 
structured in a way that promotes environmental harm.  . . . 
Ruppert, supra note 25, at 25–27. 
 70 BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 122. 
 71 Coase, supra note 44, at 11. 
 72 Id. 
 73 See., e.g., Stephen E. Draper, The Unintended Consequences of Tradable Property 
Rights to Water, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 49, 51 (2005) (“The externalities that result 
in the failure of tradable property rights to water are significant.  Transaction costs can 
severely distort the economic efficiency of private water allocation markets.”); see also 
Coase, supra note 44, at 9 (“The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very spe-
cial kind) since it is able to influence the use of factors of production by administrative 
decision.”). 
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preclude, or compensate for, or incentivize individuals to take 
precautionary measures to avoid the imposition of harms on oth-
ers, or create effective and efficient liability and compensation 
schemes when externalities are imposed.74  All of these issues 
rear their head when runoff is involved. 
From an economics perspective, controlling runoff or other 
externalities that society defines as harmful requires an analysis 
of whether the market, common law concepts of nuisance or tres-
pass, or governmental regulation is the most effective way to cor-
rect externalities: 
  Economic theory suggests that the correction of non-trivial exter-
nalities can be approached in a number of different ways.  In general, 
these can be categorized as defining property rights and allowing bar-
gaining, taxing negative externalities and subsidizing positive exter-
nalities, or establishing regulatory controls.75 
Although Coase recognizes the potential for market failures that 
require government intervention in controlling externalities, he 
also provides a valuable caution about government efficiency: 
It is clear that the government has powers which might enable it to 
get some things done at a lower cost than could a private organization 
(or at any rate one without special governmental powers). But the 
governmental administrative machine is not itself costless.  It can, in 
fact, on occasion be extremely costly. Furthermore, there is no reason 
to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fal-
lible administration subject to political pressures and operating with-
out any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which in-
crease the efficiency with which the economic system operates. 
Furthermore, such general regulations which must apply to a wide 
variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in which they are 
clearly inappropriate. From these considerations it follows that direct 
governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results than 
leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm.76 
Coase continues by hedging that regulation may at times con-
tribute to economic efficiency: 
But equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental 
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in eco-
nomic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is nor-
mally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are 
involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem 
 
 74 Smith, supra note 39, at 462 (“One initial take on the evolution of property rights 
is to focus on the costs and benefits of defining and enforcing them. Demsetz proposed 
that property rights are devices to internalize externalities and will develop when the 
gains of internalization outweigh its costs.”). 
 75 BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 186. 
 76 Coase, supra note 44, at 9. 
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through the market or the firm may be high.77 
As Coase suggests, when faced with issues like runoff, there is a 
delicate balance between the efficiency of government versus pri-
vate regulation for the control of externalities.78 
Again, economics should play a role in formulating control 
strategies for runoff.  Market difficulties might sometimes justify 
regulation, but it should not be presumed that resorting to coer-
cive regulation is the optimal solution.  “It would be unwise for a 
society simply to ban all activities with (costly) external effects or 
to make all those engaging in them pay for the effects.”79  We 
must recognize that negative externalities occur as a result of 
runoff, but need not immediately jump to an assumption that 
governmental regulation is necessary for or capable of solving the 
harms that may be caused from such runoff. 
IV. RUNOFF AND TRACEABILITY 
When deciding between public, private, or no appropriate 
means of regulating runoff and other land use controls,80 trace-
ability is a primary issue.  To assign private or regulatory liabili-
ties, one must be able to “trace” the origin of pollutants that con-
tribute to the degradation of a water body.81  When traceability is 
difficult, it is often assumed that markets and common law 
remedies will fail to control externalities.82  Determining the ori-
gin of sediment or other pollution that has “run off” from “some-
where” is very difficult. 
Markets and the common law work best when foreign 
sources of pollution are identifiable and traceable—a harmed in-
dividual knows who to blame.  “Unlike point source pollution, 
nonpoint source pollution does not emanate from ‘discrete con-
veyance[s].’”83  In the absence of traceability, two conflicting pri-
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 39, at 52; see also id. at 52 n.27 (“The term [ex-
ternality] can quite understandably, but also quite misleadingly, be taken to suggest that 
the best response to external costs is always to ban or otherwise control the activities seen 
to give rise to them.”). 
 80 See id. at 745. 
 81 Tanya L. Forsheit, International Emissions Trading: Equity Issues in the Search 
for Market-Based Solutions to Global Environmental Degradation, 18 U. PA. J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 689, 719 (1997) (discussing pollution and the difficulties of tracing the sources of 
harms); Christina Marie Frankino, Note, The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Oregon Natural 
Desert Association v. Dombeck: “Discharging” Responsibility for Water Pollution on Fed-
eral Lands, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 431, 484 n.95 (1999) (discussing traceability problems 
from cattle grazing). 
 82 See BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 25–26 (discussing how the Coase 
Theorem describes a market remedy when externalities can be identified). 
 83 Tobin, supra note 27, at 811. 
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mary choices remain for legal controls and regulators: (1) identify 
the problem as a market failure and create a system to regulate 
all potential sources or contributors; or (2) recognize the inabil-
ities to trace such pollutants, and retreat to a point where legal 
controls are inappropriate, unjust, or inefficient because general 
controls may ensnare individuals without culpability in the costs 
of a generally applicable regulatory system.  The debate involves 
command and control mechanisms versus market based mecha-
nisms for controlling pollution. 
If we know that a polluted water body has been contami-
nated from multiple sources, runoff and otherwise, allocating li-
abilities is complicated by these traceability problems.  Once a 
polluted water body is identified, the ability to pin-point who or 
what contributed to the degraded nature of the water body is “ex-
ceedingly difficult,” as one author explains: 
[T]here are still some feasibility problems that hinder the process [of 
nonpoint source pollution controls]. For example, identifying nonpoint 
sources is exceedingly difficult. The source of pollutants carried by wa-
ter runoff is often nearly impossible to determine even with the help of 
the best scientists.84 
This identification problem makes allocation of liability—private 
or public—also exceedingly complex, including when the govern-
ment sets up programs or standards to attempt to do so.85  Such 
feasibility problems raise both problems of possible under-
regulation, or, more likely, over-regulation to compensate for the 
lack of information once the government has decided such pollu-
tion is a problem worthy of combating.  Once a “better safe than 
sorry” approach emerges as a regulatory ethic, undoubtedly mi-
nor or non-contributors to pollution will become ensnared in 
costly regulation.  With that reality, the issue of regulatory error 
is particularly acute in areas like runoff where contributions and 
traceability are difficult to identify or measure. 
A primary difficulty with runoff regulation, therefore, is that 
multiple sources mix together, making a targeted liability analy-
sis difficult.  Not only do different nonpoint sources blend to-
gether, but all of those sources also mix together in a water body 
with pollutants from point sources, making traceability and allo-
cation a very difficult regulatory task, at least if one is attempt-
ing to efficiently and fairly impose controls. 
Even the most ardent free market environmentalists admit 
 
 84 Johnson, supra note 2, at 370 (emphasis added). 
 85 Id. at 369–70 (explaining that “[i]n Meiburg, the Eleventh Circuit seemingly in-
corporated what has been the argument against nonpoint source TMDLs for many years: 
nonpoint source TMDLs are expensive and difficult to measure,” but critiquing the argu-
ment that nonpoint source pollution sources cannot be identified and measured). 
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that market-based controls for water pollution are difficult be-
cause of the problems with contributory identification and trace-
ability: 
In terms of applying a market solution to environmental problems, 
few areas are more troublesome than water pollution.  Because pollut-
ers are often difficult to identify and because rights to clean water are 
not vested in individuals or clearly specified organizations, the costs of 
garbage disposal into streams, lakes, or oceans can be easily passed on 
to others.  Under these circumstances, a free market solution to water 
pollution seems elusive.86 
The difficulties of tracing responsible parties—or at least their 
level of responsibility—might justify using governmental regula-
tion.  Yet, one must ask whether the government itself can any 
more efficiently allocate liabilities than the market can when 
these traceability problems exist.87  Perhaps, the best the gov-
ernment can do is engage in anticipatory or estimated liability 
for runoff pollution and create a regulatory system, although 
such a speculative enterprise (speculative precisely because for 
many contributions no one can know from where or whence they 
come) undoubtedly leads to over-regulation if that is the adopted 
regulatory philosophy. 
With the diffuse nature of runoff, it becomes a policy choice 
in deciding whether the market or traditional doctrines of nui-
sance and trespass can handle these problems, or whether con-
trolling actual or potential runoff contributions justify govern-
mental intervention because of these traceability problems.  All 
of this requires, of course, a reasoned judgment on what “sources” 
constitute “problems” and a decision on whether government 
regulators have the capacity, capability, or comprehension to 
make such determinations.  Without confidence in traceability, 
there cannot be confidence in causation and liability, including 
allocation between potential contributors. 
Three major economic problems arising from traceability 
problems affect the control of runoff: (1) collective action prob-
lems; (2) free rider problems; and (3) information costs. 
One must be cognizant of collective action problems when-
ever deciding whether private individuals are capable of forming 
private solutions to pollution control.88  Especially with problems 
 
 86 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 138–39. 
 87 See Terry L. Anderson, Markets and the Environment: Friends or Foes?, 55 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 81, 83 (2004) (challenging a presumption of government regulation as the 
solution to externality problems). 
 88 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 39, at 357 (“[T]he cost of their getting together may 
be enough to discourage effective market bargaining.  The negotiating problem is com-
pounded even more if the [pollution] comes not from a single smoke stack but from an in-
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like runoff, these traceability concerns create an assumption that 
problems are sufficiently dispersed that no single, harmed, ra-
tional economic individual will have a sufficient incentive to ac-
cess market or judicial control options to prevent runoff or seek 
damages.  Additionally, no individual will have an incentive to go 
it alone, or be the first to blame another for harm because every-
one else effected can free-ride off of their efforts.  “Many indi-
viduals may be affected by the pollution, but each suffers only a 
small amount of damage.”89  The transaction costs to combat such 
pollution simply may be too high to justify private enforcement or 
negotiation options.90  Whether it is an entire community’s det-
riment or a discrete individual’s, this traceability problem out-
prices some from using market or other private-based remedies.  
This statement does not necessarily advocate coercive regulation 
but must, at the very least, be recognized as a legitimate concern 
and cause for discussion about solutions.91  In the process of 
evaluation, the capacity of government regulation to fill the void, 
which inherently involves the inefficiencies of government and 
the control of influential groups—from industry and environ-
mental interests—should be a factor.92 
Multiple contributors, difficulty in identifying sources, and 
difficulty in allocating responsibility for runoff pollution illus-
trate the complexities in creating market or judicial land use con-
trol solutions.  Persons affected or societal effects in general can 
 
dustrial district.  In such cases, it may be too costly to internalize effects through the 
marketplace.”). 
 89 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 139. 
 90 For a discussion of the difficulties regarding information costs, see BUTLER & 
DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 120–21. 
 91 Anderson and Leal concede that the unique nature of water pollution and identifi-
cation and traceability issues “may” justify regulation, but such regulation must be ap-
proached cautiously: 
  [I]f the polluter is easily identifiable or if the damage is concentrated on a 
single individual or a small group, then there is an incentive to arrive at an op-
timal level of pollution.  When these conditions are lacking, a regulatory solu-
tion may be called upon.  Then the problem becomes one of choosing an optimal 
level of pollution in the political arena. 
ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 140. 
 92 Anderson and Leal explain the collective action problem, along with the potential 
pitfalls of a governmental regulatory solution: 
  Because the costs of bringing together those who use a marine environ-
ment are often high enough to prevent joint action against polluters, a case can 
be made for some regulatory authority . . . to control the level of pollution.  Of 
course, one of the problems with government control is that special interests 
that engage in waste disposal are just as likely—or perhaps even more likely, if 
they are well organized—to influence the agency as are those who suffer dam-
ages.  The capture of regulatory policies by polluters is not surprising when we 
realize that the costs of control are concentrated on the polluter but the bene-
fits are diffused across the population. 
Id. at 139–40. 
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be recognized; however, substantial costs must be expended to 
trace sources, leading to the lack of incentives to control runoff in 
the marketplace.  The diffuse nature of the pollution creates 
these collective action problems and often discourages private en-
forcement against harms. 
As Terry Anderson and Donald Leal explain: 
[W]hen marine pollution emanates from multiple sources, separating 
out pollutants and tracing them to their sources can be very costly.  
When irrigation water carrying fertilizer and pesticides is sent down-
stream by a river that feeds into an estuary, for example, the problem 
of identifying the source becomes very costly.  The damages may be 
obvious, but liability for them will be much less apparent.93 
Policymakers should take into account these market difficulties, 
but also recognize that they are not a sole justification for regula-
tion. 
V.  REGULATORY EFFICIENCY IN LIGHT OF EXTERNALITY AND 
TRACEABILITY PROBLEMS 
Runoff, stormwater, and other sources of nonpoint source 
pollution have been a major focus in the contemporary develop-
ment of water quality regulation.  As the EPA has proclaimed, 
“[n]onpoint source pollution continues to be, and is increasingly 
recognized by the public as, the largest remaining source of water 
quality impairments in the nation.”94  This EPA conclusion is de-
batable, but so long as regulatory controls move forward based on 
this assumption, they should certainly be tempered by economic 
realities, not only as to impacts, but also as to regulatory capa-
bilities and capacities when faced with such complexities. 
As Henry Butler and Christopher Drahozal note, “[t]he exis-
tence of externalities is not, by itself, justification for government 
intervention to correct the externality.”95  Alternatives must be 
considered, with full acknowledgement that market failures may 
indeed require governmental intervention through regulation if a 
runoff problem can be proved.96  Placing responsibilities on prop-
erty owners is often argued to be justified because they may be 
the least cost avoider.97 
 
 93 Id. at 140. 
 94 EPA, Nonpoint Source Program and Grants Guidelines for States and Territories, 
68 Fed. Reg. 60,653, 60,653 (Oct. 23, 2003). 
 95 BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 186.  See also Richard B. Stewart, Control-
ling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 154 
(1988) (arguing that long term pollution controls cannot be dependant on command and 
control systems of governmental regulation). 
 96 BUTLER & DRAHOZAL, supra note 43, at 121–22, 186. 
 97 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 279 (“The legal system thus assumes that generally the 
polluter has the greater ease of adjustment and control and sets its initial baseline in fa-
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One alternative to regulation is the purely transactional and 
free market approach.  This avenue again has problems due to 
externality and traceability problems, including related collective 
action, free-rider, and informational cost obstacles.  As Anderson 
and Leal explain, pollution control from a market approach re-
quires the ability to mechanize the property rights system to con-
trol pollution when there are efficiencies involved in the identifi-
cation of liabilities: 
A truly free market approach to pollution control would require pol-
luters and recipients of the discharge to bargain over the level of the 
pollution. . . . Of course, an exchange of property rights or payments 
for damages both require well-defined and enforced property rights.98 
Nonetheless, we should not adopt an assumption that regu-
lation is the only or necessarily preferable solution to these diffi-
culties—even in light of the economic realities and obstacles 
identified in this article.  Anderson and Leal continue that prop-
erty rights and their clear identification might solve some of 
these problems: 
  It is useful to reiterate the importance of the evolution of property 
rights and the common law.  As clean water and air become more 
valuable, entrepreneurs have a greater incentive to define and enforce 
rights to the resources.  If we continue to subsidize the use of these re-
sources and to subsidize the costs of disposal, however, entrepreneurs 
will not be getting the right signals. . . . 
  There is no guarantee that property rights will evolve, but we 
should not stand in the way of environmental entrepreneurs who try 
to develop them.99 
When there is a presumption in favor of regulation, society may 
foreclose more entrepreneurial and innovative marketplace solu-
tions to issues such as runoff.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
As previously noted, the purpose of this article is not to pro-
pose solutions to runoff problems, but to identify some of the ap-
propriate metrics that should play a part in formulating legal 
rules for runoff controls.  We cannot escape the reality that con-
trolling runoff, if desired or necessary for water quality, may re-
quire regulation.  But, in formulating rules, we must determine 
whether it is reasonable to expect that we can overcome practica-
ble obstacles. 
When it comes to perceived or identified environmental ex-
 
vor of the right of all people to be let alone.”). 
 98 ANDERSON & LEAL, supra note 50, at 147. 
 99 Id. at 150. 
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ternalities, there is often a presumption in favor of regulation.  
There is a presumption of market failure.  When we know that 
externalities may be imposed, concomitantly that costs may not 
be internalized, there is a reflexive tendency to move toward gov-
ernmental intervention.  However, regulators should not pre-
sume that command and control solutions—even in light of such 
difficulties—will be more effective or more efficient.100  “The mere 
fact that pollution causes physical harm does not mean that it 
necessarily constitutes some legal wrong,”101 and the mere exis-
tence of regulatory options to attempt to control potential pollu-
tion does not necessarily mean that it should be exercised. 
Economic realities can justify coercive regulation or non-
regulation.  The primary purpose of this article is to stress that, 
when making that choice, economic realities cannot be ignored—
in either direction.  Property rights and the imposition of gov-
ernmental regulations exist to advance and reflect human val-
ues102 and societal priorities—true enough.  However, the com-
plexities involved in determining legal rules cannot lose sight of 
the economic consequences and capacities of the legal system to 
deal with these problems. 
 
 100 Dukeminier and Krier provide a good summary for this article’s thesis and pur-
pose—that economic difficulties for controlling runoff may be difficult, but such difficul-
ties do not create a presumption for government regulation: 
Don’t assume that government regulation is a magic solution to resource mis-
management.  The government can fail just as the market can, particularly 
when the costs of regulation would fall on small, intensely interested groups, 
and the benefits would flow to the public at large and to future generations. 
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 39, at 55 n.31. 
 101 EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 277. 
 102 See State v. Shack, 277 A.2d. 369, 372 (N.J. 1971). 
